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 Abstract 
 The article proposes an analysis with respect to the exercise of the right to vote in the 
European Economic Interest Grouping. 
Both the European legislator through the Regulation No. 2137/1985, and the Romanian 
one, through the Law No. 161 of April 19th, 2003 related to certain measures to ensure the 
transparency in the exercise of the public dignities, of the public functions and in business, the 
prevention and sanction of corruption have given an important place to the autonomy of the will 
of the members with regard to the functioning of the group, the first one limited itself regarding 
the Organization of the group to determine the minimum number of bodies of the group, namely 
the decision-making and the group administrator. The analysis of the exercise of the right to vote 
has a triple purpose: the exercise of the right to vote, the criteria for the award of the right to 
vote and making decisions. 
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 Introduction 
 The To enable the adoption of the European Economic Interest Grouping to a multitude 
of y situations it may face to achieve its objective, the European legislator has reserved an 
important place to the autonomy of will of its members regarding its operation, though it 
provided certain mandatory rules and it authorized the Member States to draw others into their 
national laws. This one, related to the European Economic Interest Grouping organization, 
limited itself to only set a minimum number of organs of the group, leaving to its members the 
opportunity to also provide the existence of other organs, provided, however, that they are 
stipulated in the contract of association1. 
Like a legal person, the European Economic Interest Grouping has no organic existence 
and therefore no natural will. Therefore, its will is manifested itself through its bodies. 
According to Article 16 of the Regulation No.2137/1985 the will of the European 
Economic Interest Grouping will be formed in the body of deliberation which consists of the 
group members acting collectively, this body being equivalent to the general meeting of a profit 
making company. The Group’s will be accomplished by the legal acts of the administrator or the 
Group’s administrators2. 
 
                                                
1
 Members can also predict in the content of the contract of incorporation of the grouping, bodies, 
such as a supervisory board, a technical committee or a censor. 
2
 Gh. Piperea, Drept comercial, C.H. Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 139 and the next ones. 
EXERCISING THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPING 
 
The Exercise of the Right to Vote  
 The European legislator has not referred to as to the Regulation of the collegial body of 
the European Economic Interest Grouping, but it has limited to indicate how the decision-
making power can be exercised within the group, by its members, i.e. only collectively and not 
individually. The Romanian legislator has not included in its national law provisions regarding 
the way of consulting its members, leaving them to decide on issues related to the European 
Economic Interest Grouping. 
 The absence of the name of the collective body of the European Economic Interest 
Grouping can be justified by the purpose for which this legal structure was created, namely to 
mitigate, within this cooperation, the drawbacks related to the geographical distance between its 
members. It also may indicate the intention of the European legislator to detach the way the 
decisions are made within the group, from the traditional way to make decisions within a general 
meeting, specific to profit-making companies. 
 While doing so, the legislator intended to grant greater freedom to decision-making 
within the European Economic Interest Grouping, either its members physically meet in a 
general meeting, or vote from a distance by mail or other means, some national legislations 
provided mandatory physical reunions of the group members for making decisions, while leaving 
the possibility that the decisions may be taken by written consultations, however to comply with 
the spirit of the Regulation. 
With regard to the expression used with the Regulation to denote the collegial body of the 
European Economic Interest Grouping, there are different opinions in the literature. Some 
authors use the expression „The College of Members”3 which in their view corresponds to a 
broader concept than the „General Assembly”4 that they use for the meeting of the members5. 
However, other authors use the term „General Assembly” more traditional in the French law of 
the profit companies6. Considering the purpose for which the group was created, to facilitate the 
cross-border cooperation between its members, which involves overcoming the barriers linked, 
and the presence of members in a particular place, we believe that the term of the College of 
Members reflects better the designation of the body represented by the members of the grouping 
acting collectively. 
 
 Indeed, if we consider the literal meaning of the Regulation provision, designating one of 
the compulsory bodies of the European Economic Interest Grouping „the members acting 
collectively” we may consider an European Economic Interest Grouping operating without a 
general meeting of its members, i.e. the assumption that its members adopt collegial decisions 
jointly, but without meeting physically (using postal voting, for example). 
 Neither the Regulation nor the Romanian law does not reveal any obligation of the 
members to meet, or to approve the annual accounts or to consult members on a topic concerning 
the administrators or one proposed by the members. This possibility of extreme decentralization 
fits well the purpose for which the European Economic Interest Grouping was created, namely to 
mitigate the drawbacks related to the geographical distance between the members, the distance 
given by the requirement that the members be part of two different states of the European Union. 
                                                
3
 College: „Organ of collective leadership of the ministries and other central bodies of the State administration or 
certain enterprises and institutions which examines and decides on issues of competence.” According to DEX 2nd 
Edition, Univers Encyclopedia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 196. 
4
 General Assembly: „General Assembly with the participation of members in certain organizations, enterprises, 
etc.”, according to DEX, op. cit., p. 15. 
5
 F. Lemeunier, Le Groupement d'intérêt économique (GIE); Groupement européen d'interet économique (GEIE), 
10-e Edition, Dalloz Publishing House Paris, 1999, p. 221; A. Pételaud, La construction de la EEC et le GEIE, 
Revue des sociétés, 1986, p. 201; J-P Ferret, Un nouvel instrument au service de la Coopération des entreprises: le 
Groupement européen d'intérêt économique (GEIE), Rép Defrénois, 1989, p.409. 
6
 C.Saint-Alary-Houin, Le Groupement européen d'intérêt économique, instrument de Coopération dans les 
marchés the travaux, RMC, 1993, p. 887; D. Lepeltier, G. Lesguillier, GIE, GEIE. Groupement d'intérêt 
économique, Groupement d'intérêt européen économique, 2e édition, GLN Joly Publishing House, Paris, 1995, pp. 
137 et les suivantes. 
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 When the members of the European Economic Interest Grouping deem appropriate to 
meet the members in a general meeting, it can form a single body or it can be divided into two 
distinct structures, such as the Ordinary General Meeting and the Extraordinary General Meeting. 
The members’ option for a single body or one divided into two distinct parts is usually 
determined by the bond they have with the national corporate structures, whether they 
themselves are such a structure, whether they are more familiar with the way it works. 
 A first aspect on the general meeting to be covered by the contract for the formation of 
the group is its competence. Group members may agree that all the decisions be taken by the 
general meeting or certain tasks be assigned to the general ordinary meeting and certain tasks 
that to the extraordinary one. In the absence of some express provisions of the Regulation and of 
the Romanian law on the body where the collective will of members is formed the provisions 
applicable to joint stock companies or limited liability companies may constitute the inspiration 
and this because in the national Romanian legislation there are no rules governing the general 
meetings of companies of persons, companies with which the European Economic Interest 
Group resembles as legal structure7. The Ordinary General Assembly is the meeting that decides 
on the current business issues stock company, while the extraordinary one is the very existence 
of the group. 
 Regarding the exercise of voting rights issues related to the frequency of meetings, the 
call ways, quorum, majority of the General Meeting, the decision-making, the members’ 
representation in the general assembly etc. would be useful to form the subject of the constituent 
group provisions contract. 
Given that the group members are from different countries of the European Union in 
terms of their option to exercise their voting rights can reach out to its exercise by mail. 
Choosing this method of exercising the right requires the regulation by the members of the 
applicable rules of procedure from the form of the voting paper on which it should be determined 
not only the vote (positive or negative expressed by each member), but also the right content of 
the decision on which the members were consulted and the date when it was taken, the 
consultation and the deadline for submitting the voting papers, the place of consignment, the 
measures to be taken by the administrator in case of a delayed response of a member and any 
other aspect that supports the legality of the decisions taken. 
 
 Criteria to Award the Right to Vote 
 The right to vote is one of the fundamental prerogatives attached to a membership of the 
European Economic Interest Grouping8. 
 To ensure flexibility to the legal structure represented by the European Economic Interest 
Grouping, the European legislator limited itself to provide only two rules, with a mandatory 
character, on the assign criteria of the right to vote, the provisions of the Regulation being 
unfilled by the Romanian legislation governing the European Economic Interest Grouping. Thus, 
according to Article 17 section (1) each member has one vote. However, the incorporation 
agreement of the European Economic Interest Grouping may assign more than one vote to 
certain members, provided that no member does hold a majority. 
The first rule is not to deprive any member of the main prerogative attached to his 
membership to an European Economic Interest Grouping, while the second was set up to avoid 
the situation where one member would impose his will on the other members. 
Excepting these two restrictions, the group members are free to determine the manner 
and criteria for awarding the right to vote, their choice for a particular assignment principle of 
the right to vote can be influenced by the legal space in which group members come from or by 
their legal form.  
                                                
7
 S. D. Carpenaru, Drept comercial român, 8th Edition, reviewed and supplemented, Universul Juridic Publishing 
House, Bucharest, 2008, pp. 220-222. 
8
 C. Gheorghe, Drept comercial european, C.H. Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 138; D. Lepeltier, G. 
Lesguillier, op.cit., p. 137. 
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Choosing between the egalitarian system (one member=one vote) and that of an unequal 
assignment of votes can be influenced on one hand by the majority laid down by law or the 
incorporation agreement of the group for decision making. The solution one member one vote is 
an optimal solution when the decisions are taken by unanimity, while the second is the right 
solution to majority decisions. Also, the choice of the egalitarian system for the distribution of 
the voting right is a solution where there are marked differences between the economic power of 
the members and a diversity of their legal form, in order to meet the purpose for which it was 
created this legal structure i.e., which is the legal instrument for cooperation.  
The hypothesis of the unequal distribution choice of voting rights among the members of 
the European Economic Interest Grouping rises the problem of criteria, which are at the basis of 
assignment, criteria that may be different and may concern: participation to capital, when the 
grouping is set up with a capital, or the participation in financing the grouping, when it is formed 
without a capital, the capacity of a founding member of the group etc.   
Regarding the determination of the award criteria unevenly of the voting right, we 
consider that the members, regardless of their legal space of origin and their legal form should 
take into account the character of legal instrument for cross-border cooperation of the European 
Economic Interest Grouping and the need to ensure a structural stability by selecting certain 
criteria with a low degree of variability in time.  
The two mandatory rules concerning the award of the right to vote must be respected 
throughout the European Economic Interest Group operation, so that on the acquisition by a 
member by giving up to the group participation of another member is required to take into 
account that through this operation one member should hold the majority of votes. 
 
Making Decisions by the Voting Members 
Mainly, adopting the members’ decisions by voting within the European Economic 
Interest Grouping is governed by the unanimity rule (Article 17 from the Regulation). This rule 
can be an absolute one or its applicability can be derived from the lack of certain provisions from 
the incorporation agreement of the European Economic Interest Grouping9. 
The decisions for which the unanimity rule is required are those covered by the paragraph 
(2) of Article 17 of the Regulation and concern:  
− alter the objects of activity of a grouping;  
− alter the number of votes allotted to each member;  
− alter the conditions for the decision making;  
− extend the duration of a grouping beyond any period set in the incorporation agreement 
for the formation of the grouping; 
− alter the contribution of each member or of some members to the grouping’s financing. 
Unanimity is also required as an absolute rule, in the following cases, too:  
− any member of a grouping may assign his participation in the grouping, or a proportion 
thereof, either to another member or to a third party;  
− the assignment shall not take effect without the unanimous authorization of the other 
members; 
− the decision to admit new members shall be taken unanimously by the members of the 
grouping [Article 26 section (1) of the Regulations]. 
If the grouping memorandum does not contain provisions by which the members 
derogate from the unanimity rule, the unanimous decision is required in the following cases:  
− the establishment by one of a grouping member of a guarantee on his participation in a 
grouping [Article 22 section (1) of the Regulations];  
− a member of a grouping may resign in accordance with the terms laid down in the 
agreement for the formation of the grouping or, in the absence of such conditions, with the 
unanimous consent of the other members [Article 27 paragraph (1) of the Regulations]; 
                                                
9
 D. Lepeltier, G. Lesguillier, op. cit. pp. 136; GEIE: aspects pratiques: France et autres pays de la Communauté, 
Levallois-Perret: Editions Francis Lefebvre, Paris, 1993, pp. 167-170. 
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− n the event of the death of an individual who is a member of the grouping, no person may 
become a member in his/her place except as provided by the contract for the formation of the 
grouping or, in its absence, with the unanimous agreement of the members [Article 28 section (2) 
of the Regulations].  
A grouping may be dissolved up by a decision of its members ordering its dissolution. 
Such a decision should be taken unanimously, unless otherwise laid down in the agreement for 
the formation of the grouping. 
 The decisions for the adoption of which it is necessary unanimity are expressly provided 
for in the Regulations; accordingly and as otherwise clear from the provisions of section (3) of 
the article indicated above, all other decisions about the group can be taken by majority and 
quorum provided for in the articles of incorporation of the grouping. Where the contract does not 
provide otherwise, the decisions shall be taken unanimously.  
Regarding the possibility of regulating on a conventional way the quorum and majority 
required for the adoption of decisions which are outside the unanimity rule we consider that it is 
important to analyze some issues connected to the election of quorum and majority that ensures 
the optimal functioning of the European Economic Interest Grouping and the scope of the 
conventional derogation from the unanimity rule. 
Taking decisions in a general meeting requires, in the absence of such provisions both at 
an European level and with the Romanian law, the need of determination on a conventional of 
the number of members required to be present for the decisions to be representative. The 
members’ option for a high quorum is to ensure the requirement that the decision taken within 
the general meeting to be representative, but it may undermine the flexibility of the legal 
structure created in the form of the European Economic Interest Grouping. Consequently, in the 
process of determining a quorum, the members should consider the need to maintain a balance 
between the requirement that the decisions be representative and the cross-border nature of the 
grouping.  
In respect of terms provided that the decisions adopted by the members of a grouping 
also meet the vote of a majority (the favorable votes that a decision must obtain to be validly 
adopted). If a decision-making based on a majority was preferred to that based on an unanimous 
agreement establishing an European Economic Interest Grouping can specify whether it is a 
simple or qualified majority. The choice of the type of majority with which the decisions will be 
made will be based on their importance. For example, decisions regarding the voluntary 
dissolution of the grouping, turning the grouping into another legal form or the sale of property 
belonging to the grouping are decisions that by the importance they have would require a 
qualified majority.  
The option of the European Economic Interest Grouping members for a system based on 
majority decision-making practices can generate three types of decisions:  
− decisions to be taken by unanimity;  
− decisions to be taken by qualified majority;  
− decisions that are subject to a simple majority.  
Taking decisions also raises the issue of decision blocking that may arise during the 
operation of the European Economic Interest Grouping by exercising in bad faith by one of the 
members of the voting rights which would not enable the unanimity, when it is required, or by 
regulation or by the contract of association, or as a result of a parity (equal number of positive 
and negative votes).  
For these situations the members will have to stipulate who will have the decisive right 
(the members who are also managing the grouping, the president, etc.). 
Conclusions  
The European legislator’s option to regulate by the main mandatory provisions the rules 
applicable in the matter of the right to vote (the way in which it can be exercised within the 
decision-making power of its members, the criteria for the award of the right to vote, the 
situations where the decisions are taken by unanimity) and leave at the same time a great 
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freedom for the group members to organize the contractual relations, provides a sufficient degree 
of uniformity and flexibility of the group. Although a regulation in detail of the exercise of the 
right to vote in the European Economic Interest Group would have ensured uniformity and a 
high level of legal certainty, this option would have interfered to flexibility so necessary for a 
legal instrument for the cross-border cooperation and would have required a complete 
harmonization of the national laws. 
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